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The necessity of restructuring in the Ukrainian industrial sector is caused by a number
strategic social and economic problems to be resolve, namely:
·  overcoming deep economic crisis;
·  transition the economy to the state of stable growth:
·  implementation of a concept for socially oriented economy;
·  achievement proper place in the international cooperation and labor division that correspond
the Ukrainian economic potential.
  The  achievement  structurally  balanced  economy  and  its  integration  in  the  world
economy is one of the main goals of the transition to the market. Under the condition that
economic structure of  Ukraine deeply distorted by  extremely  high  concentration  of  basic
industries  with technical and technological level lagging behind the needs of modern economic
and social development pattern, there should be made deep and sound structural changes in the
industrial sector of the country.
Ways of transition to the market are greatly predetermine  by  the initial  state of  the
economy,  its  sectorial  structure,  effectiveness  territorial  labor  division,  trade,  system  of
economic and social priorities, political situation as well as the readiness of the population to
adopt principles of market relationships.2
Given extremely based heavy industry structure the restructuring over the transitional
period in Ukraine should be oriented primarily on the development of consumer goods sector
with  the emphasis  energy  conservation  technologies,  demonopolization  and  strengthening
competition.
Basic  structural  changes  in  countries  with  well  developed  market  economy  are
determined by  the objective  economic situation  with  due  influence  of  state policy  on  the
process. Under the previous practice of management in the former socialist countries structural
changes were accomplished either through the adoption some major investment projects at the
highest political level or through some ministerial decisions on capacity growth for operating
enterprises as well as new constructions without due attention paid  to  innovation  and  deep
restructuring of the existing capacities. In both cases the state declared structural policy was
implemented in the way as it was favorable ministries and  departments. Regardless of  the
formally expressed priorities for the  planned economy its structure was practically developed
through so called “from achieved on” method. There was no explicit mechanism that would
allow to build structural policy for different levels of management with due emphasis to the
economic and social criteria of the development.
The development of centrally planned system of management with its growing scope of
production and complexity of economic relationships brought finally the loss of any rational
economic strategy on the side of institutions for central planning. It was manifested in chaotic
pattern of economic and social development, emergence   numerous  distortions among  and
within the sectors, morally and physically aging of industrial apparatus, chaotic, ineffective and
prolonged its  renovation,  appearance  in  some  cases  excessive jobs  on  the  one  hand  and
unemployment  on  the  other,  legging  behind  the  world  scientific  and  technical  level  of
production, week development of social infrastructure, imbalances in existing volume of money
in turnover and goods in the market, inflation and standard of living decline.
After proclaiming its independence Ukraine have not gotten read of such state of affairs
in  the economy,  on  the  contrary  they  has  been  aggravated    by  the  brake  of  economic
cooperation with other republics of the Soviet Union  as  well as  by  the general  growth  of
national and political problems.
The situation is being deep because of instability in  transitional  period and  loses  of
manageability in the economy  with  lack of  market  tools  for  stabilization  in  the Ukrainian
economy which is still strongly tied to the economy of other republics of the former Soviet
Union.Chaotic structural changes brought some serious loses for the industrial potential of the
country and aggravated its social problems.3
The major structural factor with its deep and severe influence on the proportions of the
Ukrainian economy is the economic crisis which is currently in progress in the country. The
crisis is manifested mainly in a deep decline of output. The slump is caused by  numerous
factors and does not improve but on the contrary brings growing distortions in the structure of
the Ukrainian economy (Table 1; Chart 1).
Table 1: Structure of Industrial Sector of Ukraine, per cent
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Industry - total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Electrical Energy 3,2 3,6 6,4 9,4 11,5 11,0 12,7 12,6
Fuel 5,7 3,8 14,3 8,5 11,2 13,2 12,1 11,1
Ferrous Metallurgy 11,0 9,9 22,7 16,8 19,9 21,8 21,9 23,4
Chemical and Petrochemical 6,0 5,9 6,7 6,0 6,9 7,4 7,6 6,7
Machine-Building and
Metal Processing 30,7 26,4 18,6 19,8 17,0 16,1 14,7 15,4
Consumer Goods 10,8 12,3 6,7 6,1 4,3 2,8 2,1 1,7
Food Processing 18,6 24,4 13,6 19,7 17,1 15,1 16,1 17,2























Chart 1: Structure of Industrial Sector of Ukraine
From 1991 till now the slump has practically touched  all the industrial sectors. The
most severe decline one could observe in the consumer good sector (47 per cent in 1994, 33 per
cent in 1995, 25 per cent in 1996), building materials (36 per cent in 1994, 28 per cent in 1995,
34 per cent in 1996), wood and wood processing sector (35 per cent in 1994, 17 per cent in
1995, 19 per cent in 1996), ferrous metallurgy (24 per cent in 1993, 29 per cent in 1994, 12 per
cent in 1996). A quite specific situation was in the machine-building industry that in 1993 was a
slide growth (6 per cent) with the dramatic change in the dynamic to the deep slump of 43 per
cent in 1994 and its continuation in 1995 - 24 per cent and in 1996 - 29 per cent (Tables 2, 3).
In 1994 the industrial output of Ukraine became practically equal to the one of 1975, compared
in stable prices.5
Table 1: Industrial Output of Ukraine by Sectors
(increase (+), decrease (-), per cent to previous year)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Industry - total -0,1 -5,0 -6,0 -8,0 -28,2 -12,0 -5,1 -1,8
Electrical Energy 0,7 -4,0 -6,0 -6,0 -12,5 -6,0 -7,0 -2,6
Fuel -5,0 -11,0 -14,0 -23,0 -17,2 -10,0 -7,0 4,5
Ferrous Metallurgy -4,0 -12,0 -10,0 -24,0 -28,8 -5,0 12,0 7,7
Machine-Building and
Metal Processing 1,0 4,0 -4,0 6,0 -42,9 -24,0 -29,0 -3,6
Chemical and Petrochemical -1,0 -7,0 -13,0 -25,0 -26,4 -9,0 -3,4 -0,6
Wood and Wood
Processing 2,0 2,0 1,0 -3,0 -34,9 -17,0 -19,0 -5,1
Building Materials -2,0 1,0 -4,0 -15,0 -36 -28,0 -34,0 -7,9
Consumer Goods 0,4 -3,0 5,0 -13,0 -47,4 -33,0 -25,0 -5,2
Food Processing 0,7 -13,0 -15,0 -12,0 -19,7 -13,0 -7,0 -14,6
Table 3: Industrial Output of Ukraine by Sectors
(per cent to previous year)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Industry - total 99,9 95,0 94,0 92,0 71,8 88,0 94,9 98,2
Electrical Energy 100,7 96,0 94,0 94,0 87,5 94,0 93,0 97,4
Fuel 95,0 89,0 86,0 77,0 82,8 90,0 93,0 104,5
Ferrous Metallurgy 96,0 88,0 90,0 76,0 71,2 95,0 112,0 107,7
Machine-Building and
Metal Processing 101,0 104,0 96,0 106,0 57,1 76,0 71,0 96,4
Chemical and Petrochemical 99,0 93,0 87,0 75,0 73,6 91,0 96,6 99,4
Wood and Wood
Processing 102,0 102,0 101,0 97,0 65,1 83,0 81,0 94,9
Building Materials 98,0 101,0 96,0 85,0 64,0 72,0 66,0 92,1
Consumer Goods 100,4 97,0 105,0 87,0 52,6 67,0 75,0 94,8
Food Processing 100,7 87,0 85,0 88,0 80,3 87,0 93,0 85,4
As it was declared by the Deputy-Ministry of Economy of Ukraine Leonid Minin we
had  not just a decline but a catastrophic reduction of output in the final goods production over
the last few years. There are left in the chemical industry 37 per cent, wood processing - 33 per
cent, consumer  goods  -  22  per  cent, machine-building  -  about 20  per  cent,  machine-tool
construction - only 7 per cent that of the level of 1990.
According to the official statistics the industrial output in 1997 was only  48 per cent that
of the one in 1990. Neither of the industrial sector, except for electrical generation,  did not6
achieve the 50 per cent that of the level of 1990. The greatest slump was registered  in  the
consumer goods industry, 22 per cent of the level of 1990, construction materials - 23 per cent,
machine- building - 31 per cent, foodstuff - 36 per cent operating capacities. (Table 4; Chart 2).
Table 4: Industrial Output of Ukraine by Sectors
(per cent to 1990)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Industry - total 100 95,0 89,3 82,2 59,0 51,9 49,3 48,4
Electrical Energy 100 96,0 90,2 84,8 74,2 69,8 64,9 63,2
Fuel 100 89,0 76,5 58,9 48,8 43,9 40,8 42,7
Ferrous Metallurgy 100 88,0 79,2 60,2 42,9 40,7 45,6 49,1
Machine-Building and
Metal Processing 100 104,0 99,8 105,8 60,4 45,9 32,6 31,4
Chemical and Petrochemical 100 93,0 80,9 60,7 44,7 40,6 39,3 39,0
Wood and Wood
Processing 100 102,0 103,0 99,9 65,1 54,0 43,7 41,5
Building Materials 100 101,0 97,0 82,4 52,7 38,0 25,1 23,1
Consumer Goods 100 97,0 101,9 88,6 46,6 31,2 23,4 22,2


















Chart 2. Industrial Output of Ukraine by Sectors, per cent to 19907
The decline  in  the Ukrainian industry  is  stipulated  by  the  compound  complex  of
economic and political factors in which problems of structural changes are not the last ones.
One has to indicate that the general trend in growth rates decline was appeared even at the end of
1970-s and the beginning of 1980-s. In different sectors of industry the evidence of the decline
was different and depended on a number of factors such as the obsoleteness of fix capital,
investment, subsidies and financial support. By 1989 the decline of output in the fuel industry
had reached 2 per cent, ferrous metallurgy - 0.8 per cent, electric power generation - 0.6 per
cent. Those  negative  trends  in  the economy  objectively  showed  the necessity of  effective
structural policy which would be in the consent with the current economic needs.
The reduction of output has not brought any positive changes in the Ukrainian economic
structure and high-tech industries as well as the ones producing consumer goods have suffered
more then the other sectors of the Ukrainian economy.
Changes in sectorial proportions of capital that happened over the last years can not be
assess as the great ones and they caused mostly by physical obsoleteness of fix capital rather
then any goal oriented measures to form an optimal structure of the Ukrainian economy. For
example, at the moment that consumer goods and foodstuff processing industries suffer from a
deep decline the share of fixed capital of the industries is being consciously reduced without
obvious attempt to restore the production with the obvious domestic market. At the same time
one can observe the growth of the share for the heavy industries that aggravates the raw material
orientation of the Ukrainian economy. Among the sectors of basic industries we can see the
growing percentage of the fuel and power generating industries (from 13.4 per cent in 1989 to
18.5 per cent in 1996). The reduction of fixed capital in other sectors, in the machine-building
for instance, is caused by conversion of military industrial complex (from 27.6 per cent in 1989
to 22.3 per cent in 1996).  The similar  picture  is  in  the metallurgical  sector, chemical  and
petrochemical (by 0.2 per cent and 0.7 per cent correspondingly).
Investment in the Ukrainian economy (Tables 5, 6, 7) has reduced more than in fife
times, compared to the one in 1990 (similar prices). The same investment slump has happened
for the government investment.8
Table 5: Main Indicators of  Ukrainian Economy
(increase(+), decrease(-), per cent to previous year)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
GDP -4,0 -8,7 -9,9 -4,2 -23,0 -11,8 -10,0 -3,2
Industrial Output -0,1 -4,8 -6,4 -8,0 -27,3 -12,0 -5,1 -1,8
Consumer Goods Output 5,8 -5,1 -9,4 -15,9 -25,0 -17,8 -20,2 -21,7
Investment 1,9 -7,1 -36,9 -10,3 -22,5 -35,1 -22,0 -7,5
House Building -10,6 -17,2 -2,3 -12,8 -18,0 -14,2 -22,0
Retail Trade 11,5 -9,7 -18,0 -35,4 -13,6 -13,9 -5,1 5,9
Services 7,6 -20,7 -20,2 -22,9 -3,3 -32,3 -14,2 -5,8
Table 6: Main Indicators of Ukrainian Economy
(per cent to previous year)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
GDP 96,0 91,3 90,1 95,8 77,0 88,2 90,0 96,8
Industrial Output 99,9 95,2 93,6 92,0 72,7 88,0 94,9 98,2
Consumer Goods Output 105,8 94,9 90,6 84,1 75,0 82,2 79,8 78,3
Investment 101,9 92,9 63,1 89,7 77,5 64,9 78,0 92,5
House Building 89,4 82,8 97,7 87,2 82,0 85,8 78,0
Retail Trade 111,5 90,3 82,0 64,6 86,4 86,1 94,9 105,9
Services 107,6 79,3 79,8 77,1 96,7 67,7 85,8 94,2
Table 7: Main Indicators of Ukrainian Economy
(per cent to 1990)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
GDP 100    91,3    82,3    70,6    54,3    47,9    43,1    41,7
Industrial Output 100    95,2    89,1    82,0    59,6    52,4    49,8    48,9
Consumer Goods Output 100    94,9    86,0    72,3    54,2    44,6    35,6    27,9
Investment 100    92,9    58,6    52,6    40,8    26,4    20,6    19,1
House Building 100    82,8    80,9    70,5    57,8    49,6    38,7
Retail Trade 100    90,3    74,0    47,8    41,3    35,6    33,8    35,8
Services 100    79,3    63,3    48,8    47,2    31,9    27,4    25,8
Simultaneous  to  general  investment  reduction  there  is  a  reduction  of  budget
appropriations for the development of the Ukrainian economy. The dynamic for share of budget
appropriations for the economy was as following:
in 1990 - 49.3 per cent, in 1991 - 45.7, in 1992 - 37.2, in 1993 - 19.3, in 1994 - 32.9, in
1995 -  9.6, in 1996 - 10.1, in 1997 - 11.7 per cent.
Investment distribution by industrial sectors of Ukraine are illustrated in Tables 8, 9, 10
and Chart 3.9
Table 8: Industrial Investment in Ukraine by Sectors
(compared in stable prices, million. griven)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Industry - total 18450 15159 11149 9681 8953 6121 5055
Electrical Energy 1540 1021 700 1072 667 969 776
Coal Industry 2592 2958 2965 1509 1328 1179 1009
Oil Industry 396 335 243 581 831 326 280
Gas Industry 1125 644 199 701 548 288 475
Peat Industry 9 5 3 2 2 2 1
Ferrous Metallurgy 1650 1575 1449 1248 1198 1035 792
Nonferrous Metallurgy 174 148 95 84 68 66 61
Chemical and Petrochemical 1034 856 660 689 1440 700 280
Machine-Building and
Metal Processing 5405 3340 1828 895 687 351 269
Wood and Wood Processing 360 305 137 81 76 74 52
Building Materials 884 965 520 298 202 114 97
Glass and Clay 60 68 53 18 28 16 18
Consumer Goods 879 561 510 424 429 73 65
Food Processing 1101 1158 925 970 1449 533 487
Table 9: Industrial Investment in Ukraine by Sectors
(per cent to previous year)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Industry - total      82,2      73,5      86,8      92,5      68,4      82,6
Electrical Energy      66,3      68,6    153,1      62,2    145,3      80,1
Coal Industry    114,1    100,2      50,9      88,0      88,8      85,6
Oil Industry      84,6      72,5    239,1    143,0      39,2      85,9
Gas Industry      57,2      30,9    352,3      78,2      52,6    164,9
Peat Industry      55,6      60,0      66,7    100,0    100,0      50,0
Ferrous Metallurgy      95,5      92,0      86,1      96,0      86,4      76,5
Nonferrous Metallurgy      85,1      64,2      88,4      81,0      97,1      92,4
Chemical and Petrochemical      82,8      77,1    104,4    209,0      48,6      40,0
Machine-Building and
Metal Processing      61,8      54,7      49,0      76,8      51,1      76,6
Wood and Wood Processing      84,7      44,9      59,1      93,8      97,4      70,3
Building Materials    109,2      53,9      57,3      67,8      56,4      85,1
Glass and Clay    113,3      77,9      34,0    155,6      57,1    112,5
Consumer Goods      63,8      90,9      83,1    101,2      17,0      89,0
Food Processing    105,2      79,9    104,9    149,4      36,8      91,410
Table 10: Industrial Investment in Ukraine by Sectors
(per cent to 1990)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Industry - total      82,2      60,4      52,5      48,5      33,2      27,4
Electrical Energy      66,3      45,5      69,6      43,3      62,9      50,4
Coal Industry    114,1    114,4      58,2      51,2      45,5      38,9
Oil Industry      84,6      61,4    146,7    209,8      82,3      70,7
Gas Industry      57,2      17,7      62,3      48,7      25,6      42,2
Peat Industry      55,6      33,3      22,2      22,2      22,2      11,1
Ferrous Metallurgy      95,5      87,8      75,6      72,6      62,7      48,0
Nonferrous Metallurgy      85,1      54,6      48,3      39,1      37,9      35,1
Chemical and Petrochemical      82,8      63,8      66,6    139,3      67,7      27,1
Machine-Building and
Metal Processing      61,8      33,8      16,6      12,7        6,5        5,0
Wood and Wood Processing      84,7      38,1      22,5      21,1      20,6      14,4
Building Materials    109,2      58,8      33,7      22,9      12,9      11,0
Glass and Clay    113,3      88,3      30,0      46,7      26,7      30,0
Consumer Goods      63,8      58,0      48,2      48,8        8,3        7,4
Food Processing    105,2      84,0      88,1    131,6      48,4      44,2
















Chart 3. Industrial Investment in Ukraine by Sectors, per cent to 1990
Gross Domestic Product, the main indicator for economic development of the country
which describes the output of goods and services for the final consumption of the society was
estimated for Ukraine in the volume of 92.5 billion griven in 1997. In comparison with 1996 it
was reduced by 3.2 per cent i.e. 68 per cent that of the one in 1990. The value added was11
reduced to the same extend. In 1997 per capita GDP in Ukraine was equal to 1825 griven, that
is approximately 980 US dollars according the Ukrainian National Bank exchange rate. The
parity of consuming capacity for the per capita GDP in  Ukraine is  equal, by  some  expert
assessment, to 1.2 - 1.8 thousands US dollars. The decline of GDP growth rate considerably
diminished lately (in comparison with 1996 in 3.1 times) and now it is the lowest from the
beginning of economic crisis in Ukraine. It might be ascribed to the serious progress in the
reduction of inflation as a factor of economic stabilization.
Regardless of some reduction in the decline it has not been overcame entirely. There are
some proofs of that. By 1997 consumer goods output dropped to 28 per cent that of the level of
1990, house construction to 39 per cent, retail trade to 36 per cent, services to 26 per cent.
There has been different rate of decline for different sectors of the economy. The degree
of the decline in machine-building in 1.5 times greater than the total average for the industry.
Machine-building sector has been a hostage of  inflation  and  price growth  in  raw  material,
energy producing sectors, constantly landing them major part of its circulating capital, forced
lose so needed resources for its own production. The share of energy in total costs of machine-
building output equals 25 to 35 per cent. Because the machine-building industry is one of the
main sectors which creates scientific and industrial potential of the country the decline of its
output, especially  high-tech products, gives a negative trend in structural changes in Ukrainian
economy and accompanied by a general growth of share for heavy industries.
The output of metallurgical sector has dropped by 50.9 per cent over the crisis period.
This decline is the result of  the slump along the whole technological circle of production in the
sector. From 1990 by now  the output of main products in the ferrous metallurgy has been
reduced more  than by  half,  steel  pipes  by  more  than  three  quarters.  The  major  factors
determined the slump were as the following:
·  fuel and energy deficit;
·  lack of circulating capital;
·  coal output reduction, especially coke types of coal.
The main  consumer  for  the ferrous  metallurgy products  is  the domestic  machine-
building but the consumer suffers from the lake of circulating capital and high prices for the
metal products. Currently the cost of metal products for some enterprises considerably exceeds
the average world prices. For example, the cost of pig iron achieved the level of 180-200 US
dollars per ton while the world price equals 100-120 US dollars, the price for slab of Enakievo
Steel Meal reached 262 US dollars whereas the world price for the same products is 205-215
US dollars per ton.12
Given the general reduction of output in the metallurgical industry over the last  few
years one can admit some improvement of quality structure of the metallurgical products. The
share of advanced steel producing technologies such as electric and oxigance methods exceeded
50  per  cent in  the total  steel output that  is  much  greater  than  it  used  to  be  before  the
restructuring. It may be assessed as a positive trend on the hand of market tools. Under the
condition of total reduction of output in the sector there is a comparative growth of high quality
and competitive types. Nonetheless according to the world experience one can not rely entirely
on spontaneous positive influence of the factors and account on  automatic  achievement  the
optimal result. This is completely true as far as Ukrainian metallurgical industry is concerned.
Measures for overcoming the crisis have to be base on a deep and comprehensive restructuring
the entire industry rather then on monitoring positive shifts in the output structure while the
decrease in the industry is being in progress.
Main directions of structural changes in the ferrous metallurgy, being traditional on the
nature, are determined, first of all, the needs and the potential of domestic and foreign markets.
They are as following:
·  raising the share of electric furnace method of steel  production (currently its share is less
than 3 per cent), continued casting (in Ukraine it makes only 2 per cent of the total output,
while the world average is 24 per cent);
·  expansion the output of cold-rolled plate, first of all for carriage-building and car production;
·  output of various types of steel plates and nonferrous metal plates, pipes of small diameter,
compound profile rolled iron, precise casting products.
The directions called above determine improvement the structure of output for metal
products and raise their quality. In addition, measures of restructuring for the ferrous metallurgy
may resolve some other problems as well, first of all, the improvement of ecological state in
regions  with  well  developed  metallurgical  industry,  the  reduction  of  fuel  and  energy
consumption.  The reduction  of  coke consumption  at the expense  of  closing  down  some
obsolete blast furnaces for instance will make useless the number of coke and chemical plants
with the reduction capacities of those in operation. The main stream for the ferrous metallurgy
industry restructuring remains to be the reconstruction and technical renovation of  currently
operating capacities. The main cause of such a choice for the restructuring is the critical state of
productive  capacities,  which  are warned  out  at some  enterprises  by  60-70  per  cent,  and
backward technological level of productive circles, especially blast furnace and steel melting
processes.13
One  of  the serious  problems  of  the development  of  metallurgical  complex  is  the
deficiency of circulating capital that cause the problem of mutual payments. Unprofitability of
the most of enterprises does not allow them to renovate their circulating capital at the expense of
their own sources. Short-run loans, as the experience of few last years show, do not make any
radical improvement of the financial situation at the enterprises. Because of that, the reduction of
production costs, first of all those associated with energy consumption, which make up to 45-
48 per cent of the total costs, is the most actual problem to be resolved. The reduction of energy
consumption in its turn is directly predetermined by the restructuring of the branch of industry
itself.
There is  a  trend of  stability  for  the share  of  high  energy  consuming  technologies
producing primarily intermediate not final goods. The share of fuel industry has grown from
3.8 per cent in 1991 to 11.1 per cent in 1997, the ferrous metallurgy - from 9.9 to 23.4 per cent.
At the same time the machine-building has dropped from 26.4 to 15.4 per cent.
The biggest slump  has  happened  in  manufacturing  sector  and  those  branches  of
industries which  are working  for  consumer  goods  and  foodstuff  markets.  The  domestic
machine-building  industry  has  stopped  its  production  almost  completely  that  caused  the
distraction of domestic market for electrical appliances and other household machines.
Assessing the situation in the machine-building industry of Ukraine one can say that one
of its peculiarities remains to be the distortion of its production circle, and the commodity-
money turnover. As before there are big structural disparities, the decline of efficiency and the
growing instability at the most of the enterprises.
According to the data of the Ministry of Statistics of Ukraine the output of machine-
building and metal processing in 1996 was 49 per cent, and in 1997 - 48 per cent that of 1990’s.
The share of machine-building and metal processing industry in the total industrial output has
dropped from 30.7 per cent to 15.4 per cent, that is in two times, over the 1990-97 period.
Especially  sharp  reduction  of  output  has  happened  in  such  industries  as  metal-cutting
equipment production, 8.1 per cent that of the level of 1990, blacksmith’s and press equipment
production - 12.8 per cent, cars - 4.4 per cent (Tables 11, 12, 13).14
Table 11: Machine-Building Sector Output, thousands pieces of equipment
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Electrical Units 10,200 8,800 5,500 4,500 2,700 2,800 2,000
Metal-Cutting Machines 37,000 37,700 33,900 27,500 9,200 6,000 3,000
Blacksmith's Machines 10,900 10,800 7,900 6,100 2,500 1,400 1,400
Shaft-sinking and Tunneling Machines:
   Tunneling Machines 0,847 0,757 0,647 0,535 0,311 0,213 0,187
   Elevating Machines 0,242 0,189 0,168 0,880 0,004 0,200 0,500
   Loaders 0,790 0,650 0,420 0,100 0,017 0,320 0,260
   Electric Locomotives 0,703 0,384 0,336 0,285 0,183 0,146 0,171
Cars 156,000156,000 135,000140,000 93,590 58,700 6,900
Table 12: Machine-Building Sector Output, percents to previous year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Electrical Units      86,3      62,5      81,8      60,0    103,7      71,4
Metal-Cutting Machines    101,9      89,9      81,1      33,5      65,2      50,0
Blacksmith's Machines      99,1      73,1      77,2      41,0      56,0    100,0
Shaft-sinking and Tunneling Machines:
   Tunneling Machines      89,4      85,5      82,7      58,1      68,5      87,8
   Elevating Machines      78,1      88,9    523,8        0,5    5 000    250,0
   Loaders      82,3      64,6      23,8      17,0    1 882      81,3
   Electric Locomotives      54,6      87,5      84,8      64,2      79,8    117,1
Cars    100,0      86,5    103,7      66,9      62,7      11,8
Table 13: Machine-Building Sector Output, percent to 1990
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Electrical Units      86,3      53,9      44,1      26,5      27,5      19,6
Metal-Cutting Machines    101,9      91,6      74,3      24,9      16,2        8,1
Blacksmith's Machines      99,1      72,5      56,0      22,9      12,8      12,8
Shaft-sinking and Tunneling Machines:
   Tunneling Machines      89,4      76,4      63,2      36,7      25,1      22,1
   Elevating Machines      78,1      69,4    363,6        1,7      82,6    206,6
   Loaders      82,3      53,2      12,7        2,2      40,5      32,9
   Electric Locomotives      54,6      47,8      40,5      26,0      20,8      24,3
Cars    100,0      86,5      89,7      60,0      37,6        4,415
Among the main reasons causing the slump in manufacturing sector may be called the
following:
·  liberalization of prices and, as the result, their rapid growth for energy resources;
·  payments crisis, which creates the situation of severe deficit for money in turnover curbing
the production process as a whole;
·  sharp reduction of the demand in the shrank Ukrainian market;
·  difficulties in acquiring imported raw materials that had especially severe consequences for
cotton and textile industries.
The most dramatic developments have happened in high-tech branches of industry that
actually supposed to be the core for economic growth. The growing deindustrialization of the
country and the threat of irreversible destruction of the country’s scientific and technological
potential become apparent exactly in the high-tech  industries. The output of  the sector has
practically dropped for all the types of products with the reduction of major ones from 25 to 50
per cent that of the level of the early 1990s,  that is the reduction for more than one third. For
some types of products the slump in output is just catastrophic. For example, the production of
robots was 1.8 per cent in 1996 that of the level of 1990. And for the most high-tech industries
the slump  means  really  irreversible  degradation  of  technological  processes.  The  domestic
producers intensively lose their market positions under the severe competition in  the world
market.
Owing to a short-sighted conversion concept one can witness grave consequences in the
military-industrial complex development which  actually  concentrates  scientific  potential  and
high-tech technologies.
The decline output of durable goods output has been reduced beginning in 1991 and has
embraced practically the complete list of goods produced (Tables 14, 15, 16; Chart 4).
Table 14: Durable Goods Output in Ukraine, thousands units
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
TVs 3774 3616 2569 1919 821 315 118
Radios 777 892 812 797 302 125 47
Refrigerators 903 883 838 757 653 562 431
Washing machines 788 830 805 643 422 213 149
Vacuum cleaners 1073 1044 868 920 405 285 11416
Table 15: Durable Goods Output in Ukraine
(per cent to previous year)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
TVs 105,0 95,8 71,0 74,7 42,8 38,4 37,5
Radios 135,0 114,8 91,0 98,2 37,9 41,4 37,6
Refrigerators 102,0 97,8 94,9 90,3 86,3 86,1 76,7
Washing machines 121,0 105,3 97,0 79,9 65,6 50,5 70,0
Vacuum cleaners 119,0 97,3 83,1 106,0 44,0 70,4 40,0
Table 16: Durable Goods Output in Ukraine
(per cent to 1990)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
TVs 100,0 95,8 68,1 50,8 21,8 8,3 3,1
Radios 100,0 114,8 104,5 102,6 38,9 16,1 6,0
Refrigerators 100,0 97,8 92,8 83,8 72,3 62,2 47,7
Washing machines 100,0 105,3 102,2 81,6 53,6 27,0 18,9



















Chart 4. Durable Goods Output in Ukraine, thousands units
The reduction of output is going on in the parallel with mass filling the Ukrainian market
with imported goods similar to the domestically produced ones. The process of displacement of
home industry from the domestic market of durable goods is occurring currently under the
severe competition and the absence of state assistance to local producers. The sharp reduction of17
solvency of those section of population which is the consumer of domestically produced goods
even in the market saturated with imported goods market may also be regarded as a negative
factor of influence on the process.
The poll made among the consumers of technologically complex consumer goods has
given the major trends for the consumers’ behavior. About 70 per cent polled are intended to
acquire the imported goods exclusively, at least these produced in Russia or Belorus. Each third
polled would not buy any goods than to acquire Ukrainian produced ones.
The situation in the refrigerator market may be regarded as a typical example.
Under the Soviet Union refrigerators used to be goods in deficit and there were chronic
imbalances in this segment of market of durable goods which manifested through disparities in
the quantity and the quality of demand and supply. Nowadays the situation is being changed.
Numerous companies, seven of which are domestic producers, supply the Ukrainian consumer
with their products that can not be absorb because of the law population solvency.
It is paradoxical but instead of the decline in prices one can observe their growth  in
1997 at 30-35 per cent in the  average.  The assessments  made  show  that in  case of  price
reduction at the level of 10 per cent the total sales for these goods would grow in Ukraine at
least up to 42,000 units, and with the reduction of prices at 20 per cent it would come to more
than 110,000. However, producers prefer to make strategy on possible growth of the population
income instead of relying on the price reduction concept. The production costs have grown in
15,000-17,000 times from 1990 while the retail prices for the goods have raised in 18,000-
22,000 times over the same period. This, in the line with rapid decline  of  solvency of  the
Ukrainian population greatly reduced the capacity of the domestic market. Because of this, the
saturation with refrigerators has dropped from 88 units per 100 households in 1991 to 72 in
1997. More over, each forth refrigerator which is currently used by Ukrainian households needs
replacement or should be repaired. It means that the age of refrigerators in use will shortly reach
a  critical  level  and  is  gradually  approaching  the  complete  worn-out  steek.  Most  of  the
domestically produced  brands of refrigerators can not satisfy consumers neither  with  their
quality nor with their design. For example, the NORD Company produced refrigerators are
placed at the seventh position of their quality among the similar goods produced in the CIS
countries.
The sharp reduction of refrigerators supply by domestic producers in the early 1990s
gave foreign companies a possibility to strengthen their positions in the Ukrainian market and to
win a considerable its part comparatively easy. The population more and more prefers high
quality imported appliances. Thus, given the absence of any state support for home producers18
and  the absence of  really  competitive  home  producers  in  Ukraine western  companies  are
fighting each other for the Ukrainian market.